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1. Introduction
Most countries of the world industrialized by establishing "light," labor-intensive
manufacturing industries in which latecomers benefited from the availability of
mature and non-proprietar technology. Furthermore, a relatively large part of the
labor force was exposed to industrial practices during industrialization. Over time
industrial competence developed and laid the foundation for efficient production of
more technology-intensive industries and introduction of more sophisticated
production processes.1
A somewhat different industrialization pattern has been observed in a host of natural
resource rich countries. Their development path has largely been determined by
comparative advantage for natural resource-intensive industries, which in turn happen
to be subject to substantial economIes of scale.2 An early case is Norway whose first
significant industries produced fertilzers, carbide and alumInum. These industries
entered the Norwegian economy during the period 1899-1911, and they were all based
on abundant energy resources while raw materials were largely imported. Almost a
hundred years later Norway's industrial structure is stil heavily dominated by large-
scale natural resource-intensive industries in spite of several efforts to diversify the
economy. SimIlar industrialization patterns have been initiated in Latin America, the
Middle East and South Africa. The discovery of natural resource deposits has been
seen as a curse rather. than a blessing to the ex tent that it has been set beside
See Westphal et. aL. (1981) for an instructive description of the South Korean industrialization
process.2 The mature (10\\ technology) industries whose most critical factor for competitiveness is scale are
also resource-intensive, and most mature industries whose most critical factor for competitiveness is
access to natural resources are also subject to significant economies of scale, and dominated by large
multinationals (OECD 1993).
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contracting a disease (the Dutch disease). Sachs and Warner (1995) prov ide empirical
evidence of a negative correlation between natural resource abundance and growth.
This paper focuses on the role of the market structure and technological features of
resource-intensive industries in determning the development path of resource rich
countries, an aspect which hitherto has been largely overlooked in the literature. Let
us star with a brief outline of what the special features of natural resource-intensive
industries are: First, they tend to be capital-intensive and subject to substantial
economies of scale? Second, and similar to labor-intensive industries, the technology
applied is mature, largely non-proprietar and readily available. Third, the technology
seems to be less generic than that of "light," labor-intensive industries.. To ilustrate
the point, just imagine the shop-floor of a garent factory. From a birds-eye view it
looks quite similar to, say, a consumer electronics plant. In contrast, aluminum
smelter plants or oil refineries look a world apar from the electronics plant. Because
of sector-specific technology, resource-intensive industries are not likely to generate
the dynamic process described in Rosenberg (1976), where existing industries initiate
the establishment of new industries based on the same or similar technologies.
Fourth, the technology is to a large extent embodied in capital equipment which
depreciates slowly, leading to relatively slow diffusion of technology.
This paper develops a dynamic model that captures the features described above. It is
shown that under specified conditions the gains from exploiting economies of scale
through trade outweigh the disadvantage of beinglocked into a static Industrial
3 An analysis of the South African manufacturing sector finds that natural resource intensive industries
are by far the most capital-intensive industries in the economy (Nord ås 1996).
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structure. When these conditions hold, small resource-rich countries are not likely to
gain from infant industry protection. The rest of the paper is organized as follows:
Section two provides some empirical evidence and briefly review related research.
The mode! is presented in section 3 where the static par is sol ved and analyzed under
alternative assumptions of the market structure. In section 4 the dynarc part of the
model is sol ved while section 5 concludes and suggests some are as for further
research.
2. Relations to previous research and empirical evidence
The paper relates to four strands of previous research: natural resource economics, the
Dutch disease, trade under imperfect competition and models of uneven development.
Resource economics are simply ignored, since my concern is industriaUzation through
the establishment of mature industries subject to economies of scale. Such industries
happen to be largely, but not exclusively resource-intensive. I abstract from dynamic
efficiency issues in the extraction or haresting of natural resources also on the basis
of the observation that resource intensive industries tend to import raw materials
rather than relocate if and when local resources get scarce. Finally, it is simply
assumed that the global sto eks of natural resources are sufficient to sustain resource-
intensive industries.
The Dutch disease literature deals with macro-economic, demand-driven
repercussions of a windfall income (Corden and Near 1982, Van Wijnbergen 1984,
Krgman 1987). The discovery of a natural resource deposit or a windfall gain from
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price hikes in commodity markets are treated as exogenous shocks that may drive
more dynamic traded sectors out of business, while redundant factors of production
areabsorbed by anexpanding non-traded sector.4 I claim that this is only part of the
story. As table 1 suggests, extractionlaresting and processing of primar
commodities occupy a significant amount of scarce factors of production at the
expense of both traded and non-traded sectors. In addition, natural resource
abundance appears to have bearings on the structure of the manufacturing sector
which, as expected, tend to be biased towards mature (low-technology) resource-
intensive industries. 
5
Table 1 Correlation coeffcients, primary commoditiesl industrial structure
-0,71
-0,18
Manufacturing share of GDP
Service share of GDP
Share of total manufacturing value added:
Resource intensive 0,64
Labor-intensive -0,21High-technology -0,58Medium-technology -0,22Low-technolo 0,45
Source: Calculated from World Bank (1995) and United Nations (1993)
On this background it is assumed that resource-rich countries have comparative
advantage for resource-intensive industries, meaning that at any given output leveL, the
opportunity cost of producing one additional unit is smaller in the resource-rich
country. Resource-rich countries in Latin America, the Middle East, Australia, South
4 Corden and Neary (1982) developed a three-sector model in which "energy" is a capital-intensive
industry .
5 The correlation analysis encompasses all the middle-income countries included in the World Bank's
World Development Report, except the former Soviet Union. Middle-income countries are chosen
because they are in the proeess of industrialization, while low-income countries have not started the
process yet, and high-income countries are in the transition to post-industrialized economies. The
classification is taken from the OECD (1993).
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Africa and Norway seem to be relevant cases. This leads us to the third strand of
related research, which is trade theory. Krgman (1990) summarizes the history of
trade theoryas a "long dominance of Ricardo over Smith - of comparative advantage .
over increasing returns" (p. 4). "New" trade theory on the other hand is almost
exc1usively preoccupied with increasing returns and imperfect competition. In this
paper the two approaches are combined by raising the question: What determines the
development of a country which has comparative advantage in an industry subject to
economies of scale? Let the sector be denoted the Y - sector and let the other sec tor in
a two-sector, two-country mode! be subject to constant returns to scale and denoted
the X-sector. Ricardo predicts that our country wil export the Y-good, while Smith
predicts that the largest country wil export the Y-good (Markusen and Melvin 1981).
Jf our country is large, then the two approaehes give the same result - it wil export the
Y -good. Jf our country is small, on the other hand, the two approaches offer
conflcting results and there is a need to establish under which conditions Ricardo
dominates Smith.
Finally, the paper is related to the uneven development problem which arises from the
assumption that the X-sector is subject to dynamic increasing returns, while increasing
returns are of a statie nature in the Y -sector. The possible disadvantage of being
locked into a static industrial structure is addressed by Krugman (1987), Lucas (1988),
and Brezis et. aL. (1993). In their models the disadvantage does not amount to much
unless the two goods are good substitutes (i.e. elasticity of substitution above 1).
Otherwise the growing productivity gap is compensated by an improvement in the
laggard' s terms of trade. I extend these models to allow for technological spil overs to
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the static sector while the dynarc sector is subject to learning by doing, and show
that the lock-in effect stil prevails, but not the terms of trade effect. Furthermore,
increasing returns in the .static sector prevent the dynamic sector from expanding once
it is established in the economy. Table 2 below provides some evidence that the lock-
'in effect is stronger for relatively resource-abundant than relatively labor-abundant
developing countries. It shows the correlation between the structure of the
manufacturing sector In 1960 and 1990 In countries c1assified as middle-income
countries in 1990.6
Table 2 Correlation industrial structure 1960-1990
Share resource-intensive 1990
Share labor-intensive 1990
Share high-technology 1990
Share medium-technology 1990
Share 10w-techn010~v i 990
Source: Calculatedfrom UN various issues
Share resource-intensive 1960
0.74
-0.33
-0.48
-0.70
0.69
Share labor-intensive 1960
-0.42
0.67
0.05
0.28
-0.19
The results should be interpreted with caution, but the table does sugge st that
developing countries which embarked on a labor-intensive industrialization proeess in
the 1960s underwent more significant structural changes towards more technologically
advanced sectors during the subsequent three decades than did developing countries
which embarked on a resource-intensive industrialization process.
6 The sample inc1udes only 14 countries because data on industrial structure in 1960 were not
available for the others.
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3. The statie model
The model is a two-sector, two country, one-factor Ricardian model of international
trade. Resource-intensive industries produee mainly homogenous products, so the
appropriate market structure when increasing returns are internal to firms is
oligopolistic competition. The strategic variable is assumed to be quantity, and hence
Cournot competition applies. However, I wil first consider the case of contestable
markets as described by Baumol et. aL. (1982) and Helpman and Krgman (1985 ch.
4) as a benchmark. Contestable markets yield the highestattainable total world output
and have the property that whether economies of scale are intern al to the firm or to the
industry is immaterial for our results. The basiccontestable market model is extended
to incorporate the Ricardian approach.
Throughout the paper capital letters represent the home country while lower case
letters represent the foreign country. Both countries have a fixed labor force that is the
only factor of production.7 A Ricardian model do es not determine the trade pattern
unanimously, so I star with examining the possible statie trade equilibria. The basic
structure of the model is as follows: Consurners spend their entire income in each
period, and have homothetic preferences according to the utility function:
u = X.uyi-.u (1)
7 Bearing in mind the resource-and capital intensity of the statie sector, this is a brave simplification,
but labor input can be interpreted as comprising both direct and indirect labor, since al1 other inputs are
ultimately produced/extracted by labor. The simplification does not alter the main results of the model,
and al10w us to abstract from capital accumulation in the dynamic part of the modeI.
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Further, it is assumed that domestie and foreign goods of the same categoryare perfect
substitutes in consumption, and consumers have the same preferences in both
countries.Hence, world demand derived from equation (1) presupposes that a fixed
share of world income is spent on each good. The produetion functions for the two
sectors of the home country are given by:
y = AyL~ (2)
(3)
(4)
x = AxLx
Lx + Ly = L
where Li , i = X, Y is labor employed in the two sectors, adding up to the fixed total
labor force, and Ai is a productivity parameter. It is assumed that Ay I Ax :: ay I ax'
while a:: 1 reflects increasing returns to scale.
3.1 Contestable markets
8
The produetion possibility frontiers are drawn for both countries in figure 1.8 Both are
slightly convex, and their slopes are derived from maximizing the output of Y for a
given level of X, I.e. max AyL~ s.t. X - (L- Ly)Ax ' which yields the marginal rate of
transformation. In autarky relative prices are given by relative average costs, hence
we get the farliar equilibrium condition:
MRT= Ax ~ aMRT= Py == PaA La-I P'y y X (5)
From (1) we know that relative prices are determined by preferences and technology,
and their interrelationship is given by ¡ij(l- ¡i) = PxXj PyY. Using (2), (3) and the
condition that prices equal average cost, we find resource allocation to be
¡ij(l- ¡i) = Lx j Ly . The autarky equilbria are represented by points C and c in figure
1 for the home and foreign country respectively, and the composition of output and
consumption is given by:
X
Y
=
A x ¡.
Ay((I- tl)Lr
(6)
When the ratios P and XLY are lower in the home country compared to the foreign
country in autarky, as shown in figure 1, then there exists a trading equilbrium where
the home country exports the Y -good. This condition is fulfiled when:
8 The figure is drawn for ex = 1.2 and') = 2.
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-l =- Â -( (Ay ~J"(a-') or equivalently: Ax" ~:_,L ay Ax ax ay (7)
In other words Ricardo dominates Smith when the relative size of the labor force is
smaller thanthe product of the two countries' relative productivity advantage in each
sector raised to a factor that declines with the degree of scale economies. Note that the
condition depends only on relative productivity and the relative factor endowment,
and is independent of demand conditions.
In our context of a resource-rich home country this can be interpreted as follows: Jf
the home country is very small, resource-intensive industries wil not be established
there in a trading equilibrium. It can, however, beargued that even in this case the
upstream activity is large-scale and capital intensive, paricularly if we are concerned
with mining or off-shore oil extraction. Therefore, if we are looking at a period in
time during which natural resources are abundant, the model may be applied to a Y-
sector defined as large-scale upstream activity. Otherwise, the case when (7) is not
fulfilèd is adequately analyzed by the Dutch disease literature, and is not further
discussed here.
It remains to determine under which conditions the home country produces both goods
in a trading equilibrium. With partial specialization relative prices are given by:
111 (1- 11) = Px (x + X)/ PyY. Applying this and the condition that prices equal
average cost yields P = Ax / AyL~-l and:
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Ly a 'l Ly 1 Ax 'l (1- ,u)
- = (1- ,u)(1 + -- /l) where - o: ~ - ;: /lL Ax L ax ,u (8)
p = Ax / Ay((I- ,u)(1 + Åax / Ax r-i (9)
Conditions (7) and (8) determine the pattern of specialization and trade as a function
of relative productivity, relative size of the labor force and degree of economies of
scale: When the resource-rich country is very small, it wil be fully specialized in the
X-sector and susceptible to the Dutch disease. When it is small to medium-sized, it
wil be fully specialized in the Y-sector, while only whenÂ o: ,u I (1-,u) wil there be a
trading equilibrium where the home country produces both goods when Ax / ax o: 1.
In all cases a higher relative productivity level in the X-sector compensates for a
smaller labor force. Sector allocation of labor as s function ofAx / ax is shown in
figure 2. Note that with full specialization relative wages are given by:
W l-,u
-=Â-w ,u Wwhere -;? 1 if Â ;? ,u / (1- ,u)w (10)
The only possible Ricardian trading equilibrium with factor price equalization is
therefore obtained when there is complete specialization and Â = ,u / (1-,u). This can
only be attained through free international flow of labor or by sheer coincidence.
When parial specialization is the trading equilibrium, relative wages equal relative
productivity in the X-sector; W I w = Ax I ax o: 1 which implies that when (10) holds,
the home country would not gain from introducing the X-sector through industrial
policy measures in a statie setting. These results are summarized in proposition 1:
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Proposition 1
Given (1 )-(4) and ave rage cost pricing in both sectors:
( Ji/(a-I)
i) Increasing returns dominate comparative advantage when Å;: Ay ax
ay Ax
''')UTh , 
(1-,u) Ax Ay l'l h d' 'l'b'
II yy, en /\ o( - o( Åa-I partia specia ization is t e tra mg equi l num.
,u ax ay
iii) When Ax o( Å l-,u full speciaUzation is the trading equiUbrium.ax ,u
iv) Given Ax I ax o( 1, the on ly possible trading equilbrium with factor price
equaUzation occurs when Å = ,u / 1- ,u.
We now turn to gains from trade by comparing real income in the various trading
equilibria lo autarky. The relevant deflator is (py / (1-,u) til (px I ,u t. Deflating
autarky income, expressed as the nominal value of output in the two countries, yields
the following real income per capita:
Qau = rAiA~-1l ((1- ,u)L ya-I)O-Il) (11)
where r == ,ull (1- ,u) 
l-il . Note that real income per capita is an increasing function of
the labor force, such that the larger country has the highest income per capita in
autarky, everyhing else equal. The trading equilibrium with full specialization yields
the following real per capita income in the home and foreign country respectively:
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Q = va 
il AI-Il(À 1- j.JIl L(a-I)O-Il)
Is i. x Y j. (12a)
( J 
l-il
ro = yall A l-Il j. L(a-i)o-Il)
. fi' X Y À(I- j.) (12b)
In a fully specialized trading equilibrium the home country has a higher income per
capita the larger it is in absolute terrns, but the smaller it is relative to the foreign
trading parner. In contras t, the foreign country's real income per capita is not
affected by its own absolute size, but is higher the smaller it is relative to the trading
parner. To see why this result occurs, consider terms of trade in the case of full
specialization:
p = (1- j.) axÀ . DP o( O
j. AyLa-l' DL '
DP ). O
DÀ
(13)
From (13) we see that the home country can exploit economies of scale with less
adverse impact on its terms of trade the smaller it is in relative terms. Comparing
(12a) to (11) it appears that real income per capita is higher in the full specialization
trading equilibrium in the home country whenever Ax / ax o( À(I- j.) I j.qJ, where
qJ == (1- j.)(a-I)(1-Il)/1l o( 1. Since this condition is less restrictive than proposition 1
point iii), the home country wil always gain from free trade. In contrast there may
exist trading equilibria where the foreign country lose compared to autarky. To see
this, compare (12b) and (11) and observe that (J j., ). (J au when
Ay I ay ). (À(1 ~ j.) r / j.. The foreign country loses the increasing returns sector and
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Igains from trade only when its relative cost disadvantage in the Y -sector is suffciently
large.
Finally, in the trading equilibrium with parial specialization where the home country
produces both goods and the foreign country produces the X-good only, real income
per capita in the two countries is given by:
( ( J J(a-I)(I-¡i)
np" = rAiA~-¡i (1-,u) 1 + Â :: L (14a)
( ( J J 
(a-I)(I-¡i)
ro = 
'Va A-o-¡i)A1-¡i (l-Il) I+Â ax Lps l x. X Y r A
x
(14b)
Comparing (14a) and (14b) to (11) reveals that both countries always gain from trade
when parial specialization is the free trading equilibrium. Let us finally compare real
income in the two relevant trade regimes. Comparing (14a) to (12a) it is clear that
parial specialization yields higher real income than full specialization only when
condition (8) holds. In contrast, comparing (14b) to (12b) reveals that the foreign
country is better off with full specialization, since the introduction of the X-sector in
the home country would imply a lower relative price of the X-good compared to the
situation with full specialization. These findings are summarized in proposition 2:
Proposition 2
Given (1 )-(4), and proposition 1,
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. . . A (1- ,L)
i) Compared to autarky, both countries gainfromfree trade when -l;: Â ,ax ,L
ii) The home country always gainsfromfree trade.
iii) Compared to autarky the foreign country loses from trade when both
Ay .: (Â(1- ,L)t and Ax .: Â (1- ,L) hold.ay ,L ax ,L
ìv) The foreign country is better off with full speciaUzation than partial specialization.
We have now seen that when Ricardo dominates Smith there exist possible trading
equilbria where the larger country may lose from trade. This is a result in stark
contrast to the familiar models focusing solelyon increasing retums where the large
country always gains from free trade, while the small country may lose.
Let us finally relate the results of this section to the uneven development literature.
According to this literature, a developing country has to switch from a full
specialization to a parial specialization trading regime in order to embark on a catch
up growth trajectory. The relative productivity leve! given by condition (8) can be
interpreted as this critical switch point of trade regime. When a = 1, condition (8)
corresponds to the standard case with a competitive, constant returns to scale statie
sector as explored for example by Brezis et. aL. (1993). In their case the condition
A x I a x ~ (1- ,L) /,L is necessar and sufficient for parial specialization to be an
equilibrium. In the model developed here, there are two additional parameters, ex and
À. Because a ;: 1, Â matters and raises the threshold relative productivity necessar
for the dynamic sector to enter the economy. Due to economies of scale, the average
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product of labor in the ¥- sector dec1ines when one unit of labor leaves for the X-
sector, and more so the more scale intensive it is. This loss of income must be
counterbalanced by the X- sector, which consequently has to be more productive to
enter the economy the more scale intensive the ¥ -sector. Note that in the relatively
small country case the X-sector wil not be established unless its productivity leve! is
almost on par with the technology-leading foreign country, as seen from figure 2
which is drawn for Â. = 2. Industrialization based on scale-intensive, mature industries
therefore tend to act as a barrier to entry for other sectors, paricularly if the country is
relatively smalL. On this account we arive at a similar conc1usion as the Dutch
disease literature, but for a completely different reason. While a demand~driven cost
increase crowds out tradable sectors in Dutch disease models, an expanding tradable
scale-intensive industry prevents other sectors from entry in this model. The policy
implications of the two approaches are therefore . very different: Macro-economic
demand management may cure the Dutch disease, but it will not stop scale-intensive
industries from expanding at the expense of other sectors.
3.2 Cournot competition
Cournot competition represents the case when there are bariers to entry in the ¥-
sector. Usually entries into resource-intensive industries are regulated by government.
In addition it can be argued that large upfront investment costs act as a barier to entry
in most scale-intensive industries and as such reduce the contestability of the market.
In this section I explore how the results from section 3.1 are modified in the more
realistie case of restricted entry into the ¥ -sector. Since my concern is structural
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features of countries who industrialize on the basis of scale-intensive industries, the
analysis is confined to the case when the foreign country is fully specialized in the X-
good.
I star by finding the threshold relative productivity leve! for the X-sector
corresponding to condition (8) above, when an exogenous number of companies, n, is
established in the home country. Then the following conditions must prevail when
parial specialization is an equilibrium: a) The wage rate is the same in both sectors of
the home country and given by W = PxAx. b) The profit maximizing output in each
firm in the Y-sector allows for non-negative profits. The i-th firm's profit
maximization condition is given by (1/ a)Ay -Ila PxAxy¡O-aJ/a = Py(1-1 / n). c) Trade
between the two countries is balanced, which implies that
(1- J.)PßxÅL = J.(PxAx (L - Ly) + PyAyL~) - PxAx (L - Ly). Noting that Ly = nLYi
and solving the profit maximizing condition b) and condition c) for relative prices and
then for Ly = nLy¡ yields the sector allocation in the home country:
p=Ax
a(l-1 / n)AyL~¡-1
(1- J.)(axÅL + Ax (L - nLy¡))
=
¡.AyL~i
a(1-1/ n)(1- J.)(Âax I Ax + 1)Ly = . L
J. + a(1-1 / n)(1- J.) (15)
Finally, when Ly oc L, partial specialization is an equilibrium, which implies that:
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A 1-ll
-i~aÀ(I-I/n)-ax ll (16)
Proposition 3
The threshold relative productivity leve! given by (16) is aZways lower than the
threshold leve! given by (8).
Proof' (16) is feasible only if condition b) above is fulfilled. Given this and the
production function (2), AC = aMC ~ Py, and consequently a(1-1 / n):: 1. Q.E.D.
Intuitively proposition 3 can be explained by the fact that each company exerts some
degree of market power such that terms of trade are more favorable to the ¥ -sector in
the Cournot setting than in the contestable market setting. In addition the same leve!
of output is produced less efficiently by n :; 1 companies than by one company, such
that the X-sector can more easily match the productivity leve! in the ¥-sector. This in
turn implies that total world output is lower in the Cournot case. Real income per
capita in the two countries in the Cournot case reads:
n = n -(a-I)(l-ti) _. -(a-I)(l-¡i)
~¿'e ~¿.n, , Wc - mn (17)
where subscript C represents the Cournot case and no subscript represents the
contestable market case. Both countries have a lower real income per capita while
their real relative income is unchanged compared to the contestable market case. We
can therefore conc1ude that both countries are better off in a statie setting when the ¥-
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good is produced by one company which ears no net profits. When the Y -sector has
market power, on the other hand, the trade regime switch point is more easily
attainable,provided that the labor market is competitive, but less so the more
companies are allowed to enter. Finally, since contestable markets combined with free
trade yield the highest real income per capita attainable in the home country, industrial
policy measures which restrict entry in the Y-sector or promote the X-sector whenever
condition (16) does not hold, must induce dynamic gains which outweigh the initial
losses if they areto raise welfare. Dynarcs are analyzed in the next section.
4. Dynamics
The X-sector is competitive and subject to constant returns to scale at any point in
time. Over time, however, the sector is subject to continuous productivity
improvement through a learning-by-doing process which is internal to the sector but
external to firms. In addition, there are one-way technological spilovers from the
foreign to the domestie X-sector, assuming that the foreign country is technology-
leading. The case with no technological progress in the Y-sector is previously
analyzed by Lucas (1988) and Breezes et. aL. (1993) whose models exhibit two effects
which influence relative income in opposite directions. When preferences are
homothetic, the two effects exactly offset each other: As the productivity gap in the
X-sector widens over time, relative income remains constant due to an offsetting
improvement in the Y-sector's terms of trade when the countries are fully specialized.
19
I show that this conclusion stil hol ds when the Y-sector is subject to static increasing
returns, and then extend the model to contemplate a more realistic case.
Although it is generally true that the relative price of new goods tends to dec1ine as
their market widens and technology becomes standardized, there is not much
empirical support for the result that terms of trade in primar and mature industries
improve to offset the widening technology gap towards the more dynamic industries.
Besides, no sector is completely static. I therefore extend the standard model of
uneven development to allow the Y -sector to benefit from the general technological
development in the economy. Technical improvements in the Y-sector materialize
'-
through technology embodied in machinery and equipment and customers' product
specification and are modeled as technological spil overs from the X-sector, foreign as
well as locai.9 It turns out that this extension of previous models produces new
insights as wil be shown below. Following Krugman (1987) technological progress
is given by:
Ail = K¡(t)e, i=Y,X, o c: ê c: 1. . (18)
t
Ky(t) = HOX(z)+ Ci(Z))dz Oc:crc:õc: 1, (19)
i
Kx(t) = HX(z)+8x(z))dz (20)
t
kx (t) = f x(z)dz (21)
9 Westphal et. aL. (1981) emphasize the importance of customers' specifications as a source of
technological pro gress in Korea.
20
Equations (19) and (20) suggest that technological spillovers within an industry are
stronger than across industries and that spil overs within a country are stronger than
across national boundaries. For convenience, spil overs across countries within an
industry are set equal to spilovers across sectors within a country. I start by
examining the case of full specialization.
4.1 Full specialization
With full specialization the first term under the integral of equation (19) is zero, and
relative productivity at any point in time is given by: 10
Ay (t) r f~ ax(z)dz JE = c¡E
ax (t) = L f~ x(z)dz (22)
Relative prices are determined by (13) in the case of contestable markets and by
p = (1- jl) axÂna-i in the Cournot case. Inserting (22) in these expressions yields
jl A La-1. y
the following interesting result:
10 Strictly speaking, Ay is rather a technology parameter than a productivity parameter, since
productivity is also affected by scale.
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Proposition 4
With full specialization and technological spilovers, terms of trade remain constant
over time: I-p Âp= p (jE La-I with contestable markets,
(1- p) Àna-Ip= p (jE La-I with
Cournot competition.
Equation (22) together with proposition 4 imply that there are no catching up or
fallng further behind, but in absolute terms, the home country is left further and
further behind. Moreover, (8), (18), (20) and (21) imply that full specialization
remains an equilibrium forever in the absence of technology shocks or changes in
relative demand. This result strengthens the lock-in effect demonstrated by Lucas
(1988) and Brezis et. aL. (1993). In their models real output grows faster in the
country specialized in the dynamic sector, while in the extended model developed here
real output grows at the same rate in both countries, but the lock-in effect still
prevails.
4.2 Partial specialization
This section addresses the infant industry argument in the dynamic setting represented
by equations (18) - (21). The less dynamic Y-sector passively absorbs a fraction of
the general technological development taking place in the economy, assumed to
emanate in the X-sector. Dynamics in the X-sector are independent of development
in the y.:sector. Therefore, I follow Krugman (1987), and analyze the dynamics in
two steps. First, relative productivity in the X-sector, taking resource allocation as
given is determned. Next, resource allocation as expressed by equation (8) in the
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contestable market case and (15) in the Cournot case is taken into account. The
dynamics of the two sectors are thus given by:
Ax(t) = (KX(t)JE
ax(t) kx(t)
(23)
dK x (t) = X(t) + &(t)
dt
,(24a)
dkx (t) = x(t)
dt
(24b)
dK x (t)jdt
Kx(t)
dkx (t)jdt
=
kx (t)
x(t) + ôx(t)
Kx(t)
x(t)
--
kx(t) (25)
dKy(t) ~() ()
=UAt+axt
dt (26)
Given (18), (20) and (21) relative productivity in manufacturing wil converge on a
steady state, which implies that expression (25) approaches zero. This is a steady state
in the sense that Ax jax is constant and by (8) and (15) allocation of resources
between the two sectors in the home country is constant as well. However, relative
productivity between the X and Y sectors in the home country diverges since,
according to (18), (24a) and (26), Ax grows faster than Ay and Ax / Ay ;:1.
Therefore, long-run equilbrium with parial specialization is characterized by constant
relative productivity in the X-sector and constant resource allocation while the
divergence in relative technology leve! between the two sectors in the home country is
counterbalanced by a continuous improvement of the home country's terms of trade as
can be seen from equation (9). Interestingly, we get the offsetting terms of trade effect
with parial specialization, but not with full specialization, since world real output
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grows at the same rate in the two sectors in the latter case while world real output
grows faster in the X-sector in the former case.
I now proceed to deri ve steady state relative productivity in the X-sector in the home
country. The first step is to substitute (3) in equation (25) and set relative change in
experience indices to zero, which yield:'
(~:r À (1-8kxfKx)I-Ly / L (27)
The next step is to insert equation (8) and (15) with the restriction that(16) holds into
equation (27) for the contestable market and the Cournot case respectively:
(KX)e-i = À(I-(8-(1-,u))~)kx . ,u Kx( )e-i 1 ( J 1K l-,u l-,u kk: = À 1 + a(1.-l1 n)-- - 8 - (1- 8)a(1-11 n)-- ¡¿
(28a)
(28b)
A necessar and sufficient condition for a steady state to exist is that (8) and (16) hold
and that the graphs of the left-hand side (LHS) and the graphs of the right-hand side
(RHS) of equations (28) intersect. Since Ly I L )o 1 is not technically ruled out by
(15), the former condition is more restrictive than the latter. LHS is a downward
sloping function of Kxlkn provided that O oe E oe 1, while RHS is an upward sloping
function of Kxlx whenever the coefficient in front of the relative experience indices is
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larger than zero. The latter condition yields the interesting result that the critical rate
of technology spilovers, 8, for RHS to be upward sloping corresponds to the share of
the labor force employed in the Y -sector in autarky:
In the contestable market case: 8 ~ (1- f.) (29a)
(,0- 11 n )0- f.) / f.In the Cournot case: 8 ~ 1 + (,0-11 n)O- f.) / f. (29b)
Since it is not possible to solve equations (28) for the steady-state relative productivity
leve! analytically, I proceed by analyzing the steady state by means of figures 4 and 5
which depict the LHS and RHS of equations (28a) and (28b) respectively. Recall
from (18), (20) and (21) that steady-state relative productivity,
Ax I ax = (Kx / kJe = 8e with full specialization.Hence the minimum value 8e
must take for the X-sector to enter the home country in the first place is the one given
by the right hand side of (8) and (16). These leveis, which may be interpreted as
relative experience indices at the point of entry are shown as reference points in
figures 4 and 5, marked with an arow. By inspection of equations (28) we see that
RHS is steeper and lies further to the north the larger is a, the larger is n, the larger is
Â and the smaller is f.. An increase in 8 does not affect the intersection, but makes the
RHS curve fl atter. In other words, provided that a steady state exists, the steady state
technology gap is smaller the larger the home country, the smaller the number of firms
established in the Y -sector, the smaller the share of total consumption spent on the Y-
good, the smaller the extent of scale economies in the Y -sector and the higher the
technology spilover rate.
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Let us now turn to policy implications of these findings. First, the number of firms in
the Y -sector is usually controlled by government through licensing. Limiting the
number of companies wil raise steady state relative productivity and thus relative
income which is given by n ps / (j ps = Ax / a x' Second, the government probably has
policy measures available that affect the capacity to adopt new technology, and
thereby influence the rate of technology spilovers, 8. The most common policy
measure to promote dynamic sectors in developing countries is however to subsidize
or protect them. Assume that an import tax is levied on the X -sector and the proceeds
distributed as a lump sum transfer to consumers, and assume that the tariff rate is set
to allow a target share of the labor force to be employed in the X-sector. In figures 4
and 5 this policy measure is ilustrated by the graph of the right-hand side of equation
(27) where the rate of technology spilovers is set below the leve! necessar for (16) to
hold, and above the level given by conditions (29). The target share of the labor force
employed in the X-sector is simply entered into the equation. It turns out that if 8 is
below conditions (29), no equilibrium exists where steady state relative productivity
exceeds that given by (8) and (16). Consequently, the X-sector would have to be
protected forever and real income per capita would have been lower than in the case
with full specialization. Jf 8lies between (8) or (16) and (29), a steady state where
parial specialization isa trading equilibrium in the absenee of further protection exist
if the targeted share of the labor force in the X -sector is high enough. In figures 4 and
5 the share is set to 25 percent which is not enough to generate a sustainable shift in
trade regime since the intersection with the LHS curve lies to the left of the arrow. Il
11 The figures are drawn for 0.1.2, /. = 0.7, À = 2
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From this it can be concluded that infant industry protection is not likely to be
successful in small countries dominated by scale-intensive, mature industries.
Let us finally analyze a special case when the spilover rate exactly matches the
relative productivity leve! given by the switch point of trade regime, that is when
8£ = Â.a(1-1 / n)(I- ¡.) / ¡. . It turns out that the steady state value of Kxlkx in that
case equals 8.12 Consequently, the X-sector remains marginal and policy measures to
promote the dynamic sector have to be sustained beyondthe point where (16) holds
with equality. At this point the negative impact on average productivity in the Y-
sector of moving one additional unit of labor from the Y to the X sector exactly offset
the dynamic productivity and terms of trade gains. Accordingly we can conc1ude that
not only does the Y -sector act as a barrier to entry to other more dynamic sectors in
developing countries, it also prevents the dynamic sector from expanding once it is
established.
5. Summary and conclusions
Basic large-scale industries are typically resource-intensive, of low technology and
have few positive externalities in terms of technology spil overs to other sectors.
Therefore, most countries dominated by such industries have a policy objective to
diversify the economy. However, in most cases these efforts have not been successfuL.
This paper provides an explanation for this persistent industrial structure: The gains
from forcing structural changes are small, if any, and may in fact cause a decline in
12 To see this, insert (16) in (28b) and try the solution Kx/kx = o.
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real income per capita. Applied to resource-rich countries, it may be the case that it is
not resource-abundance per se, but rather costly policy measures aiming at
diversification of the economy that accounts for the dismal performanee found in
Sachs and Warner (1995). Further empirical research is needed to test this
hypothesis. Finally, a related area of further research is to look at the linkages
between resource-based industries and the rest of the economy. Scale-and resource
intensive industries tend to be demanding customers for services like construetion,
engineering and in some cases financial services and information and communication
services. Therefore, a better understanding of the extent and economic significance of
complementarity between the scale and resource-intensive sectors and dynamic
service sectors is needed. Paricularly as the latter become increasingly open to
international trade.
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